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Douglas MacArthur: Disordered Narcissist
Abstract
General Douglas MacArthur is one of the United States Military’s most controversial commanders as well as
one of its most celebrated. Despite being highly decorated for his many years of service, his legacy is marred by
criticisms of his tactical skill and accusations of arrogance. This essay presents a psychohistorical examination
of MacArthur's personality and its effect on his career. It supports the claims that his actions and attitudes fit
the criteria for narcissistic personality disorder and that this disorder led to his eventual firing.
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Douglas MacArthur: Disordered Narcissist 
Robert Gilbert 
 
General Douglas MacArthur is perhaps the most polarizing figure in the 
history of the United States Military. He was widely regarded by the public as one 
of America’s greatest war heroes during his years in the military, but many 
historians and fellow military strategists have questioned his abilities as a general 
and theorized that his superior national image was bolstered by his “excessive 
public relations efforts.”1 Even his most ardent supporters recognize his notorious 
egotism as a character flaw. Although it is difficult to conclusively analyze the 
mental health of the deceased, a psychohistorical examination of MacArthur 
strongly suggests that he fit the diagnostic criteria for narcissistic personality 
disorder, and that his affliction with this disorder led to his removal from 
command of the U.S. Army. 
 Psychohistory is one of the most controversial approaches to history. Its 
supporters see it as essential to the study of history, and argue that one can only 
understand historical events and figures through a psychohistorical lens, while 
skeptics feel that it has no place in the discipline due to its inherent subjectivity.2 
In Decoding the Past, historian Peter Loewenberg argues that history and 
psychoanalysis are not as different—or as difficult to combine—as one might 
think. He writes that both disciplines “study past human actions, thoughts, and 
motives” and that they share a key difference from other natural and social 
sciences: they “seek multiple explanations for single phenomena.”3 Historian 
Peter Gay agrees, and argues in Freud for Historians that “the profit the historian 
may reap from applying psychoanalytic explorations” outweighs the method’s 
potential downsides.4  
Some historians have not been quite so eager to embrace the entrance of 
psychology into their field. Perhaps the two most frequently raised and damaging 
complaints against psychohistory are these: one cannot reliably psychoanalyze the 
dead, and psychoanalysis itself is unreliable. In Shrinking History: On Freud and 
the Failure of Psychohistory, David Stannard complains that psychohistorical 
works tend to be “dismissive of the most elementary canons of evidence, logic, 
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and, most of all, imaginative restraint.”5 He proceeds to make the argument that 
Freud’s psychoanalysis is a flawed therapeutic method, and that psychoanalytic 
theory is, as a result, not a valid historical tool.67 
 Due to the controversial nature of this discipline, any historian who 
presents an argument rooted in psychohistory must defend his or her use of the 
approach. I believe that my use of psychohistory in examining the mental state of 
Douglas MacArthur capitalizes on the strengths of psychohistory while avoiding 
its most serious weaknesses. Psychohistory’s greatest strength is that it can 
provide us with a more complete understanding of past events by presenting us 
with valuable insight into the mental processes of the people who influenced 
them. I believe that a 
psychohistorical examination of Douglas MacArthur can advance our 
understanding of both his personality and his actions as a general.  
The claim that psychohistory is flawed because it is based on dubious 
Freudian theory may very well be a valid one. However, it does not call into 
question the merit of my particular work. The Freudian approach to psychohistory 
is problematic for two main reasons: it employs subjective psychoanalytical 
methods that are largely unproven, and it seeks to explain the subject’s adult 
thoughts and behavior using theories about the subject’s childhood experience, 
which in turn are justified based on the subject’s adult thoughts and behavior. 
Although this type of psychohistory can be useful, it often leads to unconvincing, 
circular arguments that tend to frustrate traditional historians.8 My approach 
compares MacArthur’s documented actions, words, and personality traits to the 
diagnostic criteria for narcissistic personality disorder found in the current edition 
of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV). This 
method enables me to make a psychohistorical argument that does not rest 
entirely on subjective or Freudian theories and finds support in proven diagnostic 
criteria. My conclusions are still based on my own admittedly subjective 
interpretations of MacArthur’s words and actions, but they are more concrete and 
defensible than many previous works of psychohistory. 
One of MacArthur’s prominent character traits was an inability to accept 
responsibility for his mistakes that was driven by his obsession with his public 
image. He demonstrated this trait throughout his career, and many of the people 
with whom he worked took notice of his outright refusal to accept blame or 
criticism. Philip F. La Follette, who served closely under MacArthur during 
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World War II, notes in his memoir that the general “could never laugh at himself; 
never admit mistakes or defeats. When these occurred he not only did not admit 
them, but he resorted to tricks—sometimes sly, childlike attempts—to cover them 
up.”9 La Follette classifies this trait as confidence rather than arrogance, and 
argues that it was a result of MacArthur’s superior intelligence.10 I believe, 
however, that this character flaw was independent of his intelligence, and that it 
suggests disordered, narcissistic thinking. The DSM lists “shows arrogant, 
haughty behaviors or attitudes,” has a “grandiose sense of self-importance (e.g., 
exaggerates achievements and talents…),” and “requires excessive admiration,” 
as three of the main diagnostic criteria for narcissistic personality disorder.11 
MacArthur’s pattern of arrogance and pathological refusal to admit to mistakes 
certainly suggests disordered thinking in line with those three criteria. 
One example of this behavior that La Follette cites occurred during a 
meeting between General MacArthur and President Roosevelt regarding strategy 
in the Pacific. Roosevelt briefly mentioned that he felt the operation MacArthur 
led on the coast of New Guinea had been costly for the American army. 
MacArthur did not take kindly to this statement; he “walked over to the President 
and said: ‘I do not know who has given you that kind of information, but whoever 
he was, he told you lies.’” MacArthur then “used his outstretched fingers as a 
ramrod to poke the President’s chest for emphasis.”12  
La Follette himself was not present at this meeting, and the editors of his 
memoir admit in a footnote that this recollection was based on a “somewhat 
simplified version” of the meeting that La Follette heard from MacArthur’s 
military secretary (Brigadier General Fellers, who had accompanied 
MacArthur).13 It is, therefore, somewhat difficult to be confident in the accuracy 
of the quote La Follette attributes to MacArthur. However, assuming General 
Fellers’s account captured the essence of the meeting, it seems that MacArthur 
reacted to the President’s mild criticism in an overly emotional and defensive 
manner. This reaction, if it did in fact occur, would be in accordance with the 
DSM’s description of narcissistic personality disorder; the manual states that 
individuals with the disorder are “very sensitive to ‘injury’ from criticism or 
defeat,” and that when they are faced with criticism, “They may react with 
disdain, rage, or defiant counterattack.”14  
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 Dwight D. Eisenhower also noticed MacArthur’s inability to admit 
mistakes; he once remarked that MacArthur “had an obsession that a high 
commander must protect his image at all costs and must never admit his 
wrongs.”15 This belief is somewhat understandable, as it is clearly important for a 
general to be regarded highly by both his soldiers and the country he serves. 
However, the fact that even other high-ranking officers such as Eisenhower 
viewed this behavior as eccentric suggests that MacArthur’s fixation that he must 
be perceived as infallible may not have been entirely rational.  
 Perhaps the most striking example of MacArthur’s obsessive need to 
always be right is his reaction to the Bonus Army situation. In 1932, thousands of 
World War I veterans gathered in Washington with their families to insist that the 
government pay them bonuses. These bonuses were not scheduled to be paid until 
1945, but the economic turmoil brought on by the Great Depression had left many 
veterans without adequate incomes, and they felt they needed an advance on the 
money. President Hoover was forced to intervene, and he charged the Army with 
the task of dispersing the protesters. MacArthur, who saw the Bonus Army as a 
communist conspiracy rather than a relatively peaceful group of financially 
challenged veterans, led the Army as it “drove out the demonstrators and 
destroyed their encampments, using tanks and tear gas.”16 The destruction of the 
protesters’ tents violated explicit orders from President Hoover, and the operation 
as a whole resulted in several injuries and at least one death.17 It eventually 
became clear that there was no communist conspiracy and the protesters “were 
only hungry Americans.”18 MacArthur, however, continued to insist otherwise. In 
his memoir Reminiscences, he asserts that “The movement was actually far deeper 
and more dangerous than an effort to secure funds,” and that “the Communists 
hoped to incite revolutionary action.”19 The fact that he held these views at the 
time is somewhat odd; that he defended them decades later when it was clear they 
were incorrect is irrational. I believe that the most plausible explanation for his 
unwavering defense of such a demonstrably false viewpoint is that he simply 
could not bring himself to tarnish his perceived image as an infallible commander 
by admitting that he had made an inaccurate judgment. 
  Linked with his fixation over his image is another defining quality of both 
Douglas MacArthur and narcissistic personality disorder: a “pervasive pattern of 
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grandiosity.”20 Throughout Reminiscences, MacArthur writes in grandiose, self-
glorifying prose. He attributes much of the U.S. Army’s success to himself 
(whether explicitly or implicitly) and places emphasis on the many awards he 
received throughout his career. In addition to demonstrating his grandiosity, this 
behavior fits another diagnostic criterion for the disorder: “requires excessive 
admiration.”21 During his discussion of the fighting in the southwest Pacific 
theater of World War II, MacArthur describes the army’s success against the 
Japanese as so impressive that it was “unique in modern war.”22 He ends this 
segment with the following sentence: “I was awarded the Distinguished Service 
Medal for the fourth time.”23 This sentence does not really cohere with the rest of 
the section, and it seems to serve the sole purpose of ensuring the reader 
understands that MacArthur was the hero of that campaign (and that he had 
previously been recognized for similar heroics on three separate occasions). 
 Russell D. Buhite also cites MacArthur’s grandiosity as an indicator of his 
narcissism. In his recent book Douglas MacArthur: Statecraft and Stagecraft in 
America’s East Asian Policy, Buhite lists the general’s “portrayal of himself as 
the frontline leader in every military success even though much of the time he was 
in Australia” as one of the reasons for which he too concludes that MacArthur 
suffered from narcissistic personality disorder.24 
 La Follette observed the general’s grandiosity in a conversation between 
MacArthur and General Harding in which they discussed their upcoming attacks 
on the Japanese. MacArthur seemed more concerned with seeking glory as a 
general than with the success of the U.S. Army as a whole; he discussed his plans 
to “demonstrate again how generalship can win with lightning strategic strokes 
against potentially overwhelming forces.”25 He also reminisced about his distaste 
for the trench warfare of World War I: “I made up my mind then that when I 
commanded in the next war, as I knew I would, that I would use my brains instead 
of the blood and guts of my men.”26 Although the goal of decreasing the brutality 
of war is a noble one, MacArthur’s assertions that he knew he would command 
the army in the next war and that his superior intellect could in some way be a 
substitute for actual soldiers are grandiose and arrogant. This quote also suggests 
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that MacArthur may have fit another characteristic of narcissistic personality 
disorder: preoccupation “with fantasies of unlimited success.”27 
 William Manchester’s American Caesar supports the view that MacArthur 
frequently exhibited self-important and grandiose behavior; he characterizes 
MacArthur’s behavior when he was Hoover’s Chief of Staff as vain. Manchester 
writes that he “sat at his desk wearing a Japanese ceremonial kimono…smoked 
cigarettes in a jeweled holder, increasingly spoke of himself in the third 
person…and had erected a fifteen-foot-high mirror behind his office chair to 
heighten his image.”28 These examples coincide both with my own interpretations 
of MacArthur’s personality and with the DSM’s characterization of narcissism. 
 It seems likely to me that MacArthur’s narcissism led to his removal from 
command of the U.S. Army during the Korean War. His removal was the result of 
a pattern of insubordination and fundamental policy disagreement between 
himself and President Truman, and I believe it was triggered by one action in 
particular: the ill-advised ultimatum MacArthur issued to China.29 I believe that 
this action is best understood in light of MacArthur’s narcissistic personality 
disorder. 
  By early 1951, President Truman had decided that the best course of 
action in Korea would be to pursue an armistice.30 The President and his 
administration believed that since the momentum had shifted in the U.N.’s favor 
and they had succeeded in pushing the Communist forces above the 38th parallel 
and out of South Korea, the time was right for both sides to end the war.31 The 
Truman administration prepared a statement that they planned to issue to the 
opposition proposing that the two sides begin peace negotiations.32 However, 
before the President had a chance to release this statement, General MacArthur 
made a statement of his own that subverted Truman’s.33 MacArthur’s statement 
was an ultimatum insisting that China surrender or face an attack upon their 
country. In addition to being blatantly in conflict with the President’s goals (of 
which the general was well aware), MacArthur’s statement was insulting to the 
Chinese. He wrote that their army was of “exaggerated and vaunted military 
power” and that it had a “complete inability to accomplish by force of arms the 
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conquest of Korea.”34 These comments instantly ruined Truman’s chances of 
seeking peace.  
Truman did not fire MacArthur until about ten days later when he 
criticized the President’s foreign policy in a letter to Congressman Joe Martin. 
However, it seems that MacArthur’s ultimatum was the main cause of his 
dismissal, and that Truman likely would have fired him even if the Martin 
controversy had not occurred.35 
It is difficult to understand MacArthur’s ultimatum if not through his 
narcissism. His actions certainly were not in the best interests of the army he 
commanded or the country he was meant to serve. His insulting ultimatum was 
unlikely to end the war, and it risked escalation. Buhite theorizes that the general 
may have intended to be removed from command in the hopes that his return to 
the U. S. would “enhance his chances in a run for the presidency in 1952.”36 
Although this may have been the case, I think it is improbable. It seems to me that 
showing open defiance and disrespect toward the office of the president is not the 
most promising strategic path to election. I agree with the explanation proposed 
by President Truman: “it was of importance to the general to prevent any 
appearance that the credit for ending the fighting should go elsewhere.”37 I 
believe that the same narcissistic traits that led MacArthur to fantasize about 
future glory during World War I and paint himself as the star of World War II 
compelled him to sabotage Truman’s attempt at peace in the hopes that he could 
be seen as the singular hero who ended the Korean War.  
My analysis of the Truman-MacArthur conflict is perhaps a little one-
sided; much of my information comes from the President and his daughter. 
However, the most crucial source in my argument that MacArthur’s narcissism 
led to his firing is the statement that he issued to China, and this statement is 
found in MacArthur’s own memoirs. I omitted MacArthur’s own explanation of 
his removal from command as I deemed it to be implausible. He theorized, in a 
lengthy public rebuttal of Truman’s Memoirs, that his firing may have resulted 
from a request he made to Washington that “a treason trial be initiated to break up 
a spy ring responsible for the purloining of my top secret reports to 
Washington.”38 Given the irrationality of this theory, I think I was justified in 
omitting the general’s explanation of his dismissal from my discussion of the 
Truman-MacArthur controversy. 
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 I believe that the examples I have presented strongly support my thesis. 
Admittedly, my arguments are based on subjective interpretations of MacArthur’s 
words and actions, but I believe that the sources I use are likely to be reliable and 
the conclusions I draw, while certainly not definitive, are at the very least 
plausible. 
A weakness of my paper is that nearly all of my primary source information 
comes from MacArthur, La Follette, President Truman, and Margaret Truman. 
None of my arguments rely solely on one of these narrators; my assertions 
regarding the general’s personality and its impact on his military career are all 
supported by multiple valid sources. However, MacArthur encountered many 
thousands of people throughout his life whose opinions of him I omitted. This 
choice enabled me to explore the sources I chose to use at greater depth, but it is 
certainly a small sample size upon which to base my conclusions.  
 Despite this small sample size, I believe the sources from which I drew my 
information are likely to be reliable. La Follette seems to me to be an excellent 
source of information about MacArthur’s character. He speaks quite highly of 
MacArthur overall (he saw the general as “an authentic military genius” and “the 
nearest replica of Caesar that has come our way”) which leads me to believe that 
his assessments of MacArthur’s flaws are fair ones and not the bitter accusations 
of a disgruntled former soldier.39 Additionally, much of the strongest support for 
my claims comes from MacArthur’s own words in Reminiscences. It seems 
unlikely that MacArthur would have been less narcissistic in reality than he was 
in his memoirs, so I see this book as perhaps the most reliable source of 
information about MacArthur’s psyche. 
 Throughout his military career, Douglas MacArthur demonstrated several 
characteristics of narcissism. He pathologically refused to admit mistakes, spoke 
in grandiose, ego-centric language, fantasized about success and power, and 
sought excessive admiration from his peers in the military and the American 
public. Although it is undeniably difficult to accurately analyze and diagnose a 
dead historical figure’s mental status, I believe that the evidence I have presented 
indicates that it is likely that MacArthur fit the criteria for narcissistic personality 
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